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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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By 1945^ Britain as it was said, had become so war weary (although
she could not compare her fate with those countries where the four
Horsemen of the Apocalypse had ranged so fiercely for so many weary
years), that her Government could no longer stand up to " face diffi-
culties and embarrassment" and therefore her leaders slipped into the
facile language manufactured by the Soviet theorists which so easily
helped in the denial of the rights of peoples, treaties^ alliances arid even
of their own thesis and comrnitrneats. It would be difficult to find a
period in history so fraught with insincerity, where such a vast chasm lay
between the spoken word and the deed. Thus, cloaked by meaningless
phraseology., the spheres of influence drawn up at Teheran, became more
strongly ou^lined at Yalta. The supposed zone of c no man's land *
between the three Great Powers, over which they had agreed upon a
joint action, did not in fact exist, for as far as the Red Army could reach,
the N.K.V.D. had virtually erected a great wall of China.
The £ Lublin Committee ' was to be the core for the formation or
rather the re-construction into a £ Provisional Polish Government * on a
" broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from
Poland itself and from Poles abroad."   A foretaste of what Moscow
meant by this broadening of its puppet government, which in itself was
anti-democratic enough (it consisted of unknown men elevated to their
position by the Soviet's aid and brought to Poland in the wake of the
Red Army), can be judged from the fact that on the same day when the
news of the announcement of the Crimean Declaration reached London,
the sixteenth concentration carnp had been established at Lubartov near
Lublin by the Soviet authorities, and that 63ooo Polish officers and privates
were the first batch to be imprisoned there.   And on the same day a
representative of this ' Lublin Committee,' a certain Colonel Spychalski
(there was no note of him in the Polish Army lists), a deputy of General
Zymierski, broadcast: c<The traitors Sosnkowski, Raozkiewicz, Arciszewski,
Mikolajczyk   and   B:r-Komorowski   of capitulation fame, will receive
well-deserved punishment.   We shall deal with them in the same way as
the Government of the Soviet Ukraine dealt with the Ukraine nationalist
lackeys of Hitler."   After such and similar statements by the Comintern
agents on the radio station controlled by Moscow, there was little hope
that Stalin would permit of free elections in Poland after the Western
pattern.   There never had been any elections of that kind under the
Soviet regime.    In Russia the election was considered as proof of the
effectiveness of the party—i.e., the state machinery—and it invariably
showed almost one hundred per cent, efficiency.    Stalin had already
explained to his people that the polling undertaken in the countries of the
Democracy was e framed/ and it was hardly to be expected that he would
condone such 'manoeuvring' under his regime.   In any case, the wording of
the Declaration itself killed any faint hope of a democratic election—for
it was announced that they were open only to c democratic and anti-Nazi